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An Alternative Approach to the 
Good Faith Controversy 
by Ronald J. Bacigal* 
The current debate over the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule has often been cast in very narrow terms. The present controversy 
often isolates the exclusionary rule from the remaining body of fourth 
amendment law and centers upon the question of whether the exclusion-
ary rule· should, in theory, and can, in practice, deter good faith mistakes. 
The 'practical' question of deterrence cannot be answered because of the 
lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule.1 A 
definitive answer to the 'theoretical' question has undesirable repercus-
sions because adoption of an overly broad good faith exception appears to 
reward ignorance,• while rejection of all forms of good faith offers no in-
centive to the police to make their best effort to comply with the fourth 
amendment. 
United States v. Leon8 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard• are very lim-
ited adoptions of the good faith exception, but their language and analy-
sis sow the seeds for a rapid and broad expansion of the exception.' 
Before the Supreme Court moves too rapidly toward acceptance of good 
faith in all search and seizure cases, it might be wise to pause and con-
sider an alternative approach that stops short of a complete endorsement 
of police good faith. This Article examines the role of police motivation in 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. Concord Col-
lege (B.S., 1964); Washington & Lee University (LL.B., 1967). 
1. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the 
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 
1983 AB.F. R&s. J. 611. 
2. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981-82). 
3. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
4. 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). 
5. United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard apply the good faith exception 
to searches pursuant to a warrant. The next question for the Court will be whether to ex-
tend the good faith exception to warrantless searches. 
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all facets of fourth amendment jurisprudence and demonstrates that the 
Court has often considered good faith as one relevant but ill-defined fac-
tor in determining substantive aspects of the fourth amendment. The Ar-
ticle concludes that this ambiguous and flexible approach to substantive 
fourth amendment rights should be utilized when applying the remedy of 
exclusion.8 
I. POLICE MOTIVATION AND 'SUBSTANTIVE' FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW 
While the good faith exception is subject to valid criticism,7 it may not 
be accurate to characterize the exception as an unprecedented concept 
designed to gut the exclusionary rule. Depending upon the definition of 
good faith, there may be considerable fourth amendment precedent for 
recognizing the motivation underlying a search. When defining a good 
faith exception, its proponents have not contended that a police officer's 
irrational motivation can justify a search so long as the officer is pure of 
heart. No. one would seriously contend that a misguided but sincere of-
ficer could break into dwellings and seize matches and cigarette lighters 
as part of his plan to eliminate marijuana smoking. The good faith excep-
tion as adopted in United States u. Leon requires objectively reasonable 
efforts to comply with the fourth amendment.8 This concept of reasona-
ble good faith can be integrated into the larger body of fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court's current 'balancing' approach to determination of 
reasonable searches is an extremely nebulous and open-ended standard,8 
that could take cognizance of reasonable good faith. Under this approach, 
the Court balances reasonable efforts (objective good faith) to accomplish 
reasonable societal goals against reasonable expectations of privacy in or-
der to determine the constitutional standard for reasonable searches. 
Thus, if motivation is defined to encompass the objective reasonableness 
of the searching officer's purpose, 1° there are existing Supreme Court de-
6. See infra text accompanying note 166. 
7. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 2; Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary 
Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 
(1982); White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 M1cH. L. REV. 1273 
(1983) .. 
8. 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.20. Leon emphasized that the good faith exception is grounded 
on an objective standard and not on the subjective good faith of individual officers. 
9. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
10. This Article uses 'motivation' and 'purpose' as functionally synonymous terms, both 
referring to the goals police officers or government agents seek to accomplish. Efforts to 
draw meaningful distinctions between motivation and purpose have not been productive. 
See generally, A Colloquium on Legislatiue Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925-1183 
(1978). 
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cisions which suggest that motivation or purpose is relevant, not only to 
the operation of the exclusionary rule, but also with respect to other ma-
jor areas of fourth amendment law .11 
At its most fundamental level, the fourth amendment seeks to protect 
individual privacy and to regulate the exercise of certain governmental 
power.111 The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the privacy aspects 
of the amendment, 18 but has neglected to address regulation of police 
conduct because of the Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule. 
Criticism of the exclusionary rule should not confuse the procedural de-
vice of excluding evidence with the substantive goal of controlling police 
conduct. Regulating the police is not. merely a means to accomplish the 
ends of the fourth amendment. Control of the police is itself a proper goal 
of the amendment. 14 Controlling police misconduct through the proce-
dural device of the exclusionary rule necessitates an examination of the 
substantive distinction between misconduct and police conduct that is 
proper under the fourth amendment. At this point motivation becomes 
relevant to substantive aspects of the amendment as well as to the rem-
edy of exclusion. u 
History reveals that the framers of the fourth amendment were primar-
ily concerned with police conduct that was arbitrary and capricious. 111 The 
use and misuse of general warrants and writs of assistance is recognized 
11. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). According to Justice White, the discussion of 
probable cause in Gates "is itself but a variation on the good-faith theme." Id. at 250 
(White, J., concurring). 
12. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
Rsv. 349 (1974); Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth 
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529 (1978). 
13. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) and Segura 
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), the Court distinguished between searches, that 
threaten privacy interests, and seizures, that 'merely' infringe upon property rights. 
14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) is a prime example of utilizing the fourth 
amendment to regulate police conduct even when the privacy interests involved are rela-
tively minor. The intrusion upon privacy in Prouse (stopping an automobile for a registra-
tion check) was slight, and had the court chosen to determine reasonableness by use of the 
balancing process, this minor intrusion upon privacy could easily have been subordinated to 
the 'weighty' interest in motor vehicle safety. Rather than focus on privacy interests, the 
court chose to emphasize the need to control a potentially arbitrary exercise of police power. 
Id. at 661. 
15. See infra text accompanying note 163. 
16. "The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed 
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and 
overlook potential invasions of privacy .... " United States v. United States Dist. Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). In McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), the Court 
observed: "Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own 
cannot be trusted." Id. at 456. 
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as one of the prime causes of the American Revolution.17 These instru-
ments gave such unfettered power to law enforcement officers that, in the 
words of James Otis, they placed " 'the liberty of every man in the hands 
of every petty officer.' "19 Security against arbitrary police intrusions is a 
basic tenet of a free society and lies at the heart of the fourth amend-
ment.1• The constitutional framers thus sought to control police power by 
proscribing certain conduct (unreasonable searches) and by prescribing 
the proper manner of conducting lawful searches (the specific commands 
of the warrant clause).10 
When interpreting both the proscriptions and prescriptions of the 
fourth amendment, the Court, at times, has found police motivation to be 
a relevant consideration. This Article examines the role that police moti-
vation has played in determining: (1) The scope of the amendment;11 (2) 
the requirement of probable cause;11 (3) the applicability of the warrant 
requirement;18 (4) the manner of executing a search;" and (5) third party 
consent.111 
A. Motivation and the Scope of the Fourth Amendment 
In Frank v. Maryland,18 the Court defined the scope of the fourth 
17. See generally Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE 
ERA OF THE A.MmucAN R.EvoLUTION 40 (R. Morris ed. 1939). 
18. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965) (quoting James 
Otis). 
19. The major historical studies of the fourth amendment begin their analysis of colonial 
searches and seizures with James Otis' famous challenge of the Writs of Assistance in Pax-
ton's Case in 1761. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CouRT (1966); 
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATBS CONSTITUTION {Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science 
Series 55, No. 2, 1937); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES 1N CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969). 
For a brief examination of colonial. searches and seizures in the period of 1661-1764, see 
Bacigal, A Case For Jury Determination of Search and Seizure Law, 15 U. Rica. L. R.Ev. 
791, 794-806 (1981). 
20. The Supreme Court has been engaged in a long-standing controversy over the rela-
tionship of the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause. See the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (overruled in Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)). The relationship between these two clauses need not 
be resolved in this Article because police motivation ill relevant when interpreting the spe-
cific commands of the warrant clause and when applying the general rubric of reasonable-
ness. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
21. See infra text accompanying note 26. 
22. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
23. See infra text accompanying note 93. 
24. See infra text accompanying note 120. 
25. See infra text accompanying note 153. 
26. 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-34 
(1967)). 
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amendment by reference to the governmental motivation that prompted 
the search. The Court in Frank viewed the fourth amendment as primar-
ily concerned with searches for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion, but did not view inspections for violations of a health code to be 
searches within the meaning of the amendment.17 Under Frank v. Mary-
land, the constitutionality of the government's conduct turned upon the 
motivation of the searching agents.18 If the agents' purpose was to obtain 
evidence for a criminal prosecution, then their action was a search and 
the fourth amendment was applicable.119 If the government agents' pur-
pose was unrelated to a criminal prosecution, then their action was not a 
search, and the fourth amendment was inapplicable. ao 
Root v. Gauper81 illustrates how a factual determination of police moti-
vation can decide the applicability of the fourth amendment. 31 In Root, 
the victim telephoned an operator saying that he had been shot and 
·needed an ambulance.•• The operator connected the victim with an am-
bulance driver who in turn notified the town marshall. The ambulance 
driver proceeded to the victim's house and radioed the marshall that he 
was transporting the victim to the hospital. 84 The marshall arrived at the 
victim's home and waited for the. sheriff to arrive. The two officers then 
entered and seized items which were subsequently offered in evidence. 86 
After holding that the police intrusion could not be justified on grounds 
of consent or plain view, the court considered the applicability of the 
27. 359 U.S. at 365-67. 
28. If the police conduct is not designated a "search," the fourth amendment is inappli-
cable, and "the law does not give a constitutional damn" about whether the police conduct 
complied with any of the provisions of the amendment. Moylan, The Fourth Amendment 
Inapplicable us. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So 
What?" 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 75, 76. 
29. "A search implies an examination of one's premises or person with a view to the 
discovery of contraband or evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action." 
Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957). 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1135 (1974), in which the court upheld an inventory search of an automobile because 
the purpose of the intrusion was: 
the police interest in protecting the property of the accused and in protecting 
themselves. It was not an interest in gathering euidence, such as seizing contra-
band or dangerous weapons. That is usually involved when a search is made on 
the basis of a warrant or on grounds that there exists probable cause combined 
with exigent circumstances. Where interests of the former kind are involved, it is 
of course of no consequence whether or not there was probable cause. 
484 F.2d at 380 n.5 (emphasis added). 
31. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971). 
32. Id. at 364. 
33. Id. at 363. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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emergency doctrine. 36 The court recognized that "police officers may 
enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assis-
tance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in 
need of that assistance."37 Applying an "objective standard as to the rea-
sonableness of the officer's belief,"86 the court found that the knowledge 
that the victim had been removed, and the fact that the marshall waited 
for the sheriff rather than entering immediately, were not consistent with 
a motive to assist an injured person.36 Instead, the facts suggested "that 
the purpose of entering the house was to obtain evidence relating to the 
commission of the crime."'0 Thus, once the court factually ascertained 
the purpose of the intrusion, the applicability of the fourth amendment 
was automatically determined. 41 
The Frank v. Maryland distinction between 'searches' motivated by 
the desire to obtain incriminating evidence, and 'intrusions' motivated by 
a desire to accomplish other purposes was overruled in Camara v. Munic-
ipal Court,41 in which the Supreine Court stated: "It is surely anoma-
lous to say that the individual and his private property are fully pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected 
of criminal behavior."" The court in Camara emphasized that an intru-
sion upon privacy is the proper test for defining the scope of the fourth 
amendment, and that the underlying governmental motivation for the in-
trusion is largely irrelevant when determining the amendment's scope." 
Camara has not, however, remained unchallenged. The Court qualified its 
position on governmental motivation in the subsequent cases of Harris v. 
United States'11 and Wyman v. James.'6 
In Harris, the Court approved the "precise and detailed findings of the 
District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals . . . to the effect that 
the discovery of the ... [seized item] was not the result of a search of 
the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police 
36. Id. at 363-65. See generally Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 9 U. Rieu. L. REV. 249 (1975). 
37. 438 F.2d at 364. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 365. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. See also United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 943 (1974). 
42. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
43. Id. at 530. 
44. Id. at 534-35. See also United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973). "[T]he scope of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by 
the subjective conclusion of the law enforcement officer." 455 F.2d at 1132. 
45. 390 U.S. 234 (1968). 
46. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
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custody.""1 The Court in Harris thus upheld the intrusion into the auto-
mobile because the police were not motivated by a desire to obtain in-
criminating evidence, but were seeking only to protect themselves from 
civil liability for the mishandling of private property."' Harris is in direct 
conflict with Camara in considering the relevance of police motivation, 
although the subsequent holding in South Dakota v. Opperman"9 may 
have repudiated Harris. The Supreme Court, however, has never repudi-
ated its discussion of governmental motivation in Wyman v. James.10 
In Wyman, Mrs. James, a welfare mother was notified that, pursuant to 
state law, welfare workers were to visit her home.11 Mrs. James refused to 
grant permission to enter her home and was notified that such refusal 
would result in the termination of all welfare assistance.12 When Mrs. 
James filed a civil rights suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the 
first issue before the Court was whether home visits by welfare workers 
constituted searches under the fourth amendment.18 The lower court had 
not considered the question of governmental .motivation, but held that 
"[a]ny unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by 
plaintiff is a search."" The Supreme Court paid homage to the tradition 
of jealous protection of fourth amendment rights, but then declared the 
tradition irrelevant to the facts of Wyman "for the seemingly obvious and 
simple reason that we are not concerned here with any search . . . in the 
Fourth Amendment meaning of that term.''" Although the Court recog-
nized the possibility that a 'visit' by welfare officials could uncover evi-
dence of fraud and lead to a possible criminal prosecution, the Court held 
that the prime purpose of the visit was not investigative in a criminal 
sense.16 "It is ... true that the caseworker's posture ... is perhaps, in a 
sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we 
think, is given too broad a character and far more emphasis than it de-
serves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law 
47. 390 U.S. at 236. 
48. Id. 
49. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See infra text accompanying note 104. 
50. 400 U.S. at 309. 
51. Id. at 313-14. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 314-16. The Court held that the 'visits' were not searches under the fourth 
amendment. Id. at 323-24. The Court held in the alternative that if the visits were searches, 
they were nonetheless reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 326. For a discussion 
of the alternative holding, see infra text accompanying note 73. 
54. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Wyman v. 
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The district court went on to hold that "[l]ike most of the Bill 
of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic 
protection for everyone." 303 F. Supp. at 941. 
55. 400 U.S. at 317. 
56. Id. at 323. 
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context."67 
A search 'in the traditional criminal law context' is a quest for incrimi-
nating evidence.&11 Under the holding of Wyman, a government intrusion 
for a purpose other than criminal investigation is simply not a search, and 
the fourth amendment is totally inapplicable.119 The purpose behind the 
intrusion may be a 'noble' community interest (e.g., public welfare) as in 
Wyman, or it may be a very narrow interest as in Harris v. United States 
(e.g., protecting the police from civil liability for the mishandling of pri-
vate property). Wyman and Harris indicate that it is not necessary to 
characterize the purpose of the intrusion as noble or as serving broad 
community interest. The important factor is to characterize the motiva-
tion as other than a quest for incriminating evidence. Once the intrusion 
is so characterized, the fourth amendment is deemed inapplicable. 
The relevance of police motivation in determining the scope of the 
fourth amendment reached its apex in Frank v. Maryland.8° and has been 
followed by a general retreat with some exceptions. By emphasizing the 
privacy aspects of the fourth amendment, the subsequent holdings in 
Camara61 and Katz v. United States61 suggested that police motivation 
was largely immaterial in defining the scope of the amendment. The ex-
ceptions, however, such as Wyman and Harris, indicate that while gov-
ernmental motivation may no longer be the sole determinative factor, 
governmental motivation continues to play some role in defining the ap-
plicability of the fourth amendment. The lower courts continue to con-
sider police motivation and sometimes distinguish between a fourth 
amendment search and a civil intrusion upon the basis of that 
motivaiion. 88 
B. Police Motivation and the Requirements of Probable Cause or 
Reasonableness 
The fourth amendment consists of two conjunctive clauses: the rea-
sonableness clause, which protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the warrant clause, which prescribes conditions for the issu-
ance of a warrant. 114 The proper relationship between these two clauses 
57. Id. at 317 (emphasis added). 
58. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
59. 400 U.S. at 326. 
60. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
61. 387 U.S. at 528. 
62. 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967). 
63. See generally Bacigal, supra note 36. 
64. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
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has been the subject of much debate centering on whether the clauses a.re 
dependent or independent of each other. One view holds that reasonable-
ness is the ultimate standard for a search and "there can be no ready test 
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to 
search against the invasion which the search entails.',.6 The other view 
holds that balancing to determine reasonableness is the exception and 
that the warrant clause standard of probable cause is the general rule for 
determining the constitutionality of searches." 
The two views shade into each other when the Court defines reasona-
bleness by looking to the warrant clause and defines the probable cause 
requirement of the warrant clause by looking back to the reasonableness 
clause. 67 With the Court's recognition of a 'sliding scale' of probable 
cause, 68 police motivation is relevant under either the reasonableness 
standard or the probable cause standard. In applying either standard, the 
Court balances the government's purpose in searching against the intru-
sion upon privacy. Thus, "it would seem to make no difference in terms 
of outcome whether the balancing is done merely to determine what is 
reasonable or to determine what level of probable cause is required.''H 
Whether the balancing is done under the reasonableness or probable 
cause standard, the purpose (motivation) of the police must first be iden-
tified and accorded weight before the balancing can occur. For example, 
the motivation to save lives is accorded more weight than the motivation 
to obtain incriminating evidence and will thus affect the outcome of the 
balancing process. In acknowledging the relevance of police motivation, 
Justice Jackson observed: 
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw 
a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it 
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers 
might be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. 
However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, exe-
cuted fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject 
travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life 
and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a 
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
65. 387 U.S. at 536-37. 
66. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-14 (1979). 
67. "In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be ob-
tained, 'probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested 
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." 387 U.S. at 534. 
68. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux:: The Rise and Fall of Probable 
Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763. 
69. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Be-
yond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 40, 56 n.86 (1968). 
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roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and 
catch a bootlegger.70 
The Court also recognized the relevance of governmental motivation in 
Wyman v. James.71 Although the primary holding of Wyman was that 
the noncriminal purpose of the intrusion made it a 'nonsearch,'711 the 
Court also noted that, if the intrusion is deemed to be a search, it is not 
unconstitutional because it "does not descend to the level of unreasona-
bleness."78 The Wyman opinion listed eleven factors that led the Court to 
conclude that the search was not unreasonable. 14 These factors essentially 
consist of the noncriminal interests served by such intrusions. 711 Thus, in 
an alternative holding, the Court i~ Wyman recognized the motivation 
underlying a search as one factor in determining its reasonableness.78 
More directly on point is Cady v. Dombrowski,11 in which the Court 
upheld a warrantless search on the ground that the motivation of the po-
lice was to perform "community caretaking functions, totally divorced 
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
the violation of a criminal estatute."78 Dombrowski concerned the arrest 
of an off-duty policeman for driving while intoxicated. The car he was 
driving was towed to a garage, and the police inventoried the automobile 
in order to remove the police revolver defendant was believed to have 
been carrying.7' In the process, the police discovered blood-stained ob-
jects that led to defendant's conviction for murder.80 The Court took note 
70. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also 
People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956). "Necessity often justifies an action 
... where the act is prompted by the motive of preserving life or property .... " 47 Cal. 
2d at 377, 303 P.2d at 723. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court recognized the 
need to protect the physical safety of police and noted: "We are now concerned with more 
than the governmental interest in investigating crime .... " 392 U.S. at 23 (emphasis 
added). For suggestions that the severity of the crime is an appropriate factor in the balanc-
ing process, see Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 
1011, 1040 (1973). 
71. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
72. Id. at 317-18. 
73. Id. at 318. 
74. Id. at 318-24. 
75. For example, "The public's interest in ... assistance to the unfortunate .... " Id. 
at 318; "The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority." Id. at 322; "[T]he [welfare] 
program concerns dependent children and the needy families of those children. It does not 
deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime." Id. at 323; "The 
home visit is not a criminal investigation .•.. " Id. 
76. Id. at 318-19. 
77. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
78. Id. at 441. 
79. Id. at 436-37. 
80. Id. at 437-39. 
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of the 'specific motivation' of the intruding officer, which was "concern 
for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an in-
truder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle,"81 and held that 
this purpose justified the search as constitutionally reasonable.81 
Jus~ how far police motivation can go in reducing the required level of 
probable cause was illustrated in People v. Sirhan.88 The government ac-
tion in Sirhan, a warrantless search of a private dwelling and seizure of a 
personal diary, intruded upon interests that society generally considers 
intimately private." Balanced against these interests was the desire of the 
police to dispel the potential panic that could follow a political assassina-
tion. 86 The Supreme Court of California held the search and seizure to be 
reasonable because: 
The crime was one of enormous gravity, and the "gravity of the offense" 
is an appropriate factor to take into consideration . . . . The victim was 
a major presidential candidate, and a crime of violence had already been 
committed against him. The crime thus involved far more than possibly 
idle threats. Although the officers did not have reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the house contained evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate 
prominent political leaders, we believe that the mere possibility that 
there might be such evidence in the house fully warranted the officers' 
actions. It is not difficult to envisage what would have been the effect on 
this nation if several more political assassinations had followed that of 
Senator Kennedy.86 
The possible police motives for intruding upon privacy are infinitely 
diverse. In noncriminal situations, the motives can range from control of 
political demonstrations87 to protecting underprivileged children.88 Police 
motivation in traditional criminal law searches can range from checking 
for violation of automobile registratidn laws89 to apprehending vicious 
murderers. 80 Although individual justices have cautioned us "to be most 
81. Id. at 447. 
82. Id. at 448. 
83. 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 
(1973). 
84. 7 Cal. 3d at 736, 497 P.2d at 1138, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 402. 
85. Id. at 737-39, 497 P.2d at 1139-40, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04. 
86. Id. at 739, 497 P.2d at 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (citations omitted). 
87. In Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 
1972), the court stated: "It has long been the policy in Richmond and other places 
throughout the nation to photograph persons participating in vigils, demonstrations, pro-
tests and other like activities whether peaceful or otherwise." 330 F. Supp. at 309. 
88. Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
89. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
90. See Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410 
U.S. 947 (1973). But cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in which the Court rejected 
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on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are be-
neficent, "111 the courts have often considered police motivation when de-
termining the reasonableness of a search.112 
C. Police Motivation and the Warrant Requirement 
The probable cause or reasonableness standards, in theory and in fact, 
may be flexible enough to take account of police motivation. A court must 
balance the right to privacy against other legitimate interests, and it may 
strike the balance at different points, depending upon the governmental 
motivation underlying the search, for example, the desire to save lives 
versus the desire to obtain incriminating evidence. The same need for 
flexibility is not so apparent, however, with respect to the warrant re-
quirement. Its function is not to balance conflicting interests, but to serve 
as a limitation of police power by providing a procedure which assures 
that the judiciary performs the balancing of interests.93 When police by-
pass the magistrate and conduct a warrantless search they usurp the judi-
cial function of determining when the right of privacy can be set aside. 
The courts should be jealous of this power and skeptical of the need of 
police to exercise such power. Thus, the warrant requirement should re-
main a strict requirement and should not be bypassed solely because of a 
benevolent motive of the police conducting the search. 
Of course, the warrant requirement is not absolute and the Supreme 
Court has long recognized a 1,1umber of exceptions to the warrant require-
ment ... In the words of Camara,115 the warrant procedure may be by-
passed whenever "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate 
the governmental purpose behind the search. "96 In determining whether 
the warrant requirement would frustrate the purpose of the search, the 
lower courts have traditionally considered three factors: (1) the time re-
quired to obtain a warrant;117 (2) the time required to frustrate the search 
a 'murder scene' exception to the warrant requirement. 437 U.S. at 395. 
91. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (over-
ruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)). 
92. See, e.g., Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966), in which the court held that 
probable cause requires only "some basis from which the court can determine that the [in-
trusion] was not arbitrary or harrassing." Id. at 415. 
93. The protection of the warrant clause "consists in requiring that those inferences 
[concerning probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
94. See Haddad, Well-Delineated Ex.ceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable 
Couse, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1977). 
95. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
96. Id. at 533. 
97. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 319 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (considering 
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by destroying or altering the object of the search;" and (3) the likelihood 
that the destruction or alteration will take place.'" Those who advocate 
extending the good faith exception to warrantless searches100 would add a 
fourth factor for consideration: the nature of the government interest 
that may be frustrated by the delay required to obtain a warrant. The 
proponents of a good faith exception for· warrantless searches argue that 
any delay to obtain a warrant creates some risk of frustrating the search, 
and that the risk society is willing to run is colored by the governmental 
purpose behind the search. In order to protect privacy, society may be 
willing to run a fairly high risk of frustrating the search when the purpose 
of the search is merely to obtain incriminating evidence of some minor 
crime. Society, however, is willing to run very little risk of frustrating a 
search when the purpose of a search is the more significant interest in 
preserving life.101 
Chief Justice Burger subscribes to this view and gave an early indica-
tion of his position on 'good faith' when sitting on the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Burger stated the following in 
Wayne v. United States:102 "When policemen, firemen or other public 
officers are confronted with evidence which would lead a prudent and rea-
sonable official to see a need to act to protect life or property, they are 
authorized to act on that information, even if ultimately found errone-
ous. "103 Somewhat surprisingly, the Chief Justice did not discuss the rele-
vance of good faith when the opportunity arose in South Dakota v. Op-
perman. 104 Rather than emphasize the good faith of the officers who 
efficiency of administrative machinery for issuing a warrant); People v. Torres, 45 A.D.2d 
185, 357 N.Y.S.2d 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (difficulty of obtaining warrant on a Saturday 
night); Raffield v. State, 333 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (difficulty of obtaining 
warrant on Christmas Eve). 
98. The 'no knock' cases most often deal with the ease with which evidence can be 
destroyed. See, e.g., State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971). See infra text 
accompanying note 127. 
99. Most evidence is not self-destructing. But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(1966). Thus, the court must assess the likelihood that some party will take affirmstive ac-
tion to destroy or alter the object of the search. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
100. See supra note 5. 
101. This view was expounded in Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. 
denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965). "The delay which would necessarily have resulted from an 
application for a search warrant might have been the difference between life and death 
. . . . The preservation of human life has been considered paramount to the constitutional 
demand of a search warrant as a condition precedent to the invasion of the privacy of a 
dwelling house." 236 Md. at 396, 204 A.2d at 80. See also United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 
412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978). 
102. 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
103. Id. at 212. 
104. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
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inventoried an impounded vehicle, the Chief Justice focused on the di-
minished expectation of privacy in automobiles and decided the case 
under the general rubric of reasonableness.1011 It was left to Justice Powell 
to address the warrant requirement in a concurring opinion.108 
Justice Powell identified three purposes served by the warrant require-
ment, two of which relate to the issue of controlling police misconduct 
and the issue of good faith. 107 The first function of a warrant is to insure 
that the police officer does not make a discretionary and potentially dis-
criminatory determination to search, thereby substituting his judgment 
for that of the magistrate.108 Justice Powell found that inventory searches 
pursuant to uniform and standardized police department procedures in-
sure the good faith (i.e., nondiscriminatory intent) of the searching officer 
and thus alleviate the need for a search warrant.108 The second related 
purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent hindsight and police 
perjury110 from affecting the evaluation of the constitutionality of a 
search.111 Justice Powell found that inventory searches conducted in ac-
cordance with routine police department practices insure the good faith 
of the searching officer by precluding the opportunity for postsearch per-
jury by police. m Justice Powell thus employed a doctrine of equivalent 
protections, 118 in which case, constitutionality depended on whether the 
challenged procedures provided adequate substitute safeguards that com-
pensated for noncompliance with the warrant clause. The standardized 
police department regulations in South Dakota v. Opperman insured the 
good faith of the searching officers, and thus served the same purpose as 
the warrant clause in controlling potential police misconduct. m 
105. Id. at 367. 
106. Id. at 376 (Powell, J., concurring). 
107. Id. at 383-84. The third purpose of a warrant, not relevant here, is that a warrant 
communicates to the citizen that the police are acting under lawful authority and sets forth 
the lawful limits of the power to search. Id. at 384. 
108. Id. at 383. 
109. Id. 
110. "[A]fter-the-event justification for the ... search [is] too likely to be subtly influ-
enced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964). 
111. 428 U.S. at 383. 
112. Id. 
113. The concept of equivalent protections may have originated in Trupiano v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (overruled in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1949) 
(overruled in Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)). Chief Justice Vinson objected 
to an insistence "upon the use of a search warrant in situations where the issuance of such a 
warrant can contribute nothing to the preservation of the rights which the Fourth Amend-
ment was intended to protect .... " 334 U.S. at 714-15 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
114. There have been numerous suggestions that police department regulations are supe-
rior to the exclusionary rule in controlling police conduct. See K. DAVIS, POLICE D1scRET10N 
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The Supreme Court, however, has not uniformly allowed good faith or 
noble motives to excuse the absence of a warrant. In Payton v. New 
York,m the Court enforced the warrant requirement in spite of many law 
enforcement agencies' good faith reliance on considerable precedent au-
thorizing a warrantless arrest in a dwelling.116 The Court in Mincey v. 
Arizonam refused to recognize a 'murder scene' exception to the warrant 
requirement, despite noble intent to apprehend vicious murderers.118 The 
opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman and the lower court cases address-
ing searches designed to save lives indicate, however, that police motiva-
tion may play a part in determining when the police must obtain a 
warrant.11• 
D. Motivation and the Manner of Executing a Search 
A search that is lawful at its inception (i.e., the issuance of the warrant 
is proper) may become illegal because of the manner in which the search 
is executed. 120 The requirement that police give notice before entering the 
premises to be searched and the scope and intensity of the search once 
the police are properly within the premises are considerations of prime 
relevance. 
In Ker v. California, 1111 the Supreme Court dealt with the question of 
notice prior to entry for purposes of making an arrest.122 The lower courts 
have generally assumed that Ker applies to search warrants.1118 Except in 
those jurisdictions where the magistrate may issue a 'no-knock' war-
rant, 1" the decision to give or dispense with notice is entrusted to the 
police officers executing the search warrant. 11111 The officer's decision is not 
discretionary, but must be based on the officer's good faith and reasona-
(1975); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974). 
115. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
116. Id. at 583-603. 
117. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
118. Id. at 388-95. 
119. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 236 Md. at 395-98, 204 A.2d at 80-82. 
120. The discussion in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), assumed "that the 
officers properly executed the warrant ... . "Id. at 3419 n.19. 
121. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). . 
122. Id. at 37-41. 
123. See, e.g., State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971). 
124. See generally Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock & Nonsense, An Alleged Constitu· 
tional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 626 (1970). . 
125. When police give notice, it raises questions of whether the police have given the 
occupant a reasonable opportunity to respond, People v. Abdon, 30 Cal. App. 3d 972, 106 
Cal. Rptr. 879 (1972), and whether the police deliberately timed the notice in such a way as 
to make a prompt response impossible. United States v. Noreikis, 481 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 
1973). 
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ble assessment that the existing circumstances fit within one of the fol-
lowing recognized exceptions to the notice requirement: (1) the useless 
gesture exception; (2) the destruction-of-evidence exception; or (3) the 
danger-to-person exception.116 State v. Gassner,1117 is illustrative of how 
the first two exceptions relate to the issue of police good faith. 
In Gassner, the state endeavored to justify an unannounced entry of 
the defendant's apartment on grounds that the officer believed the apart-
ment was vacant, Ha or in the alternative, that notice was not required 
when police were searching for drugs that could easily be destroyed.119 
Regarding the useless gesture exception, the.court found that the officer's 
assumption that he was entering a vacant apartment was unwarranted 
under both an objective and subjective standard.130 The officer's belief 
failed to meet the objective standard because there were no objective 
facts indicating the apartment was vacant. There was also some indica-
tion of subjective bad faith "in· the testimony of the apartment manager 
that the police plan, before they even went to the apartment, was to just 
knock and enter with the pass key."1111 
The police officer's concern with the destruction-of-evidence exception 
also failed to meet objective and subjective standards.181 The court sum-
marily rejected the State's rather weak efforts to establish the officer's 
subjective belief regarding the destruction of evidence arid accepted the 
thrust of the officer's testimony that he was not thinking about potential 
destruction at the time of his entry.183 
The court in Gassner also commented upon the wisdom of a 'blanket 
rule' in which a court does not require notice whenever the seizable items 
are drugs because of the ease with which the evidence can be destroyed.184 
The court stated that such a blanket rule could lead to anomalous results 
in which an exception to the constitutional requirement of notice would 
totally consume the requirement. m Under a blanket rule, unannounced 
entry would be permitted, even though the police were subjectively aware 
that the destruction of evidence was impossible.136 The court also noted 
126. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
127. 6 Or. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822 (1971). 
128. No ~me was seen entering or leaving; the time of day was as likely to suggest occu-
pancy as vacancy. Id. at 458-59, 488 P.2d at 825. 
129. Id. at 458, 488 P.2d at 824-25. 
130. Id. at 458-59, 488 P.2d at 825. 
131. Id. at 459, 488 P.2d at 825. 
132. Id. at 465, 488 P.2d at 828. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 463, 488 P.2d at 827. See, e.g., State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973); 
State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974). 
135. 6 Or. App. at 463, 488 P.2d at 827. 
136. Id. The court cited Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 
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that most jurisdictions had rejected a blanket rule in favor of a require-
ment that the police officer make a specific showing of the facts warrant-
ing a conclusion that destruction of the evidence was likely.137 The court 
in Gassner then adopted a compromise position authorizing unannounced 
entries when the officer reasonably believes there is a likelihood of de-
struction because: (1) The officer has probable cause to believe there is a 
small, readily disposable amount of evidence; or (2) the officer, in good 
faith, does not know the amount.118 The court found a lack of a subjective 
and reasonable belief on the part of the searching officer because the of-
ficer was subjectively aware that the drugs to be seized were of a suffi-
cient quantity to preclude rapid destruction.189 
The danger-to-person exception to the notice requirement does not 
raise any questions distinct from the destruction-of-evidence exception. 
In People v. Dumas,140 the court considered whether to apply a blanket 
rule to situations in which the police reasonably believe the suspect to be 
in possession of a weapon.m As in Gassner, the court in Dumas rejected 
a blanket rule and required that police officers demonstrate a reasonable 
belief "based on specific facts and not on broad unsupported presump-
tions"1'1 that a weapon will be used against them if they give notice. 148 
Likewise in Tatman v. State,14' the court found only an unsupported as-
sertion of fear that defendant might have a weapon and thus found a lack 
of support for a 'good faith belief on the part of the police officers.140 
Courts in these cases rejecting blanket rules to justify no-knock entries 
have engaged in an examination of police good faith. The officer's belief 
that the circumstances justify a no-knock entry must be both genuine 
(good faith belieO and objectively reasonable (supported by specific 
facts). The officer's good faith is also relevant in assessing the reasonable-
ness of the search actually carried out after a lawful entry.1' 6 
"As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer 
(1970), in which the police made an unannounced search for five pounds of marijuana in a 
third-floor college dormitory room, knowing that the room contained no toilet, and knowing 
there were no means of escape other than the one door they entered. Id. at 433-34, 272 A.2d 
at 272. 
137. 6 Or. App. at 462, 488 P.2d at 827-28. See, e.g., People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 
432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967). 
138. 6 Or. App. at 464, 488 P.2d at 827-28. 
139. Id. at 464, 488 P.2d at 828. The seized drugs were 1,000 Benzedrine pills. 
140. 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 ~1973). 
141. Id. at 878-79, 512 P.2d at 1213-14, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10. 
142. Id. at 879, 512 P.2d at 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309. 
143. Id. at 878-79, 512 P.2d at 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309. 
144. 320 A.2d 750 (Del. 1974). 
145. Id. at 751. 
146. Id. 
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executing the warrant.''147 The command of the fourth amendment that 
warrants particularly describe the items to be seized148 was intended to 
prevent the type of police misconduct historically associated with general 
warrants.149 The statement that nothing is left to the discretion of the 
officer is an overstatement though, because a lawful search may be as in-
tense as is reasonably necessary to find the items described in the 
warrant. 
It is difficult to imagine that a case could arise where an offir..er executing 
a valid search warrant would not at some stage in the matter be required 
in the very nature of things to exercise his judgment as to what thing or 
things . . . were to be seized under the warrant. 150 
When a police officer executes a warrant, the officer's judgment must be 
objectively reasonable, and subjectively the officer must execute the war-
rant in good faith. Consequently, courts will not permit a search for sto-
len automobile tires to extend to the top shelf of a closet because the 
searching officer could not reasonably believe that the tires were located 
in such a small place. m In order to avoid general warrants, 11111 a search 
"must be directed in good faith toward finding the objects described in 
the search warrant .... "1118 The searching officer's motivation or reason 
for searching an area is thus a necessary consideration in determining the 
proper scope of a lawful search. 
E. Motivation and Third-Party Consent 
The above discussion of police motivation and the fourth amendment 
demonstrates that police motivation or purpose is at times a relevant con-
sideration in determining the constitutionality of a search. There is, how-
ever, no large body of precedent that indicates a ringing endorsement for 
utilizing police good faith as a constitutional consideration because most 
147. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
148. The fourth amendment provides that the warrant "particularly [describe] the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 16. To allow a search for items not specified in 
the search warrant "would come perilously close to reviving the long discredited general 
warrant." United States v. Sanchez, 509 F.2d 886, 890 (6th Cir. 1975). 
150. Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 866, 165 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1968). 
151. United States v. Chadwell, 427 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D. Del. 1977). Compare Common-
wealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1973), with United 
States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
152. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
153. State v. Watkins, 89 S.D. 661, 665, 237 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1975) (search warrant for 
stolen goods held to be a mere pretext for a full-scale drug raid) (overruled in State v. 
Kaseman, 273 N.W.2d 716,.722 (S.D. 1978)). See also United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. 
Supp. 871, 876 (M.D. Fla. 1971). 
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of the Supreme Court's recognition of police motivation has been tangen-
tial or covert. This lack of precedent is particularly true in the area of 
third-party consent. The Court declined an opportunity to rule upon po-
lice good faith and third-party consent when the issue was squarely 
presented in United States v. Matlock. m In Matlock the government ar-
gued that police could legitimately accept consent to search from a third 
person with 'apparent' authority to authorize a· search.111& The concept of 
apparent authority focuses on the facts as they reasonably appear to the 
police officer, even if unknown facts ultimately show that the third party 
lacked actual authority to consent to a search. 158 Under the facts in Mat-
lock, however, the Court found actual authority and, thus, declined con-
sideration of the government's theory of apparent authority. 1117 
In contrast, the Court may have given recognition, albeit implicit recog-
nition, to police good faith in another third-party consent case. In Frazier 
v. Cupp,166 the police searched defendant's duffel bag after acquiring the 
consent of defendant's cousin, Rawls, who shared the use of the bag.1611 
Defendant argued that Rawls had actual permission to use only one com-
partment of the bag and had no authority to consent to a search of the 
other compartments.180 The Court declined to "engage in such metaphysi-
cal subtleties" and held that defendant "must be taken to have assumed 
the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside."181 The 
Court's invocation of the assumption of the risk doctrine makes little 
sense from the perspective of the defendant's subjective state of mind 
(i.e., voluntary consent). The Court failed to explain why a defendant as-
sumes the risk that a cousin will consent to a search of a duffel bag when 
a defendant does not assume the risk, for example, that a hotel clerk will 
consent to a search of the defendant's room, as in Stoner v. California.1&1& 
The Court's use of assumption of risk analysis in Frazier163 makes sense 
only if the facts are viewed from the perspective of the police officer's 
state of mind. The police may reasonably be charged with knowledge that 
hotel clerks lack authority to consent to searches· of occupied hotel rooms, 
but the police cannot reasonably be charged with knowledge of secret and 
'metaphysical' divisions of authority over compartments of a duffel bag. 
The holding in Frazier is proper and distinguishable from Stoner only if 
154. 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
155. Id. at 167-69. 
156. Id. at 171 n.7. 
157. Id. at 175-78. 
158. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
159. Id. at 740. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
163. 394 U.S. at 740. 
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the Court implicitly recognized police good faith as a relevant considera-
tion in assessing the constitutionality of third-party consent searches. In 
third-party consent cases, as in the other areas discussed, police motiva-
tion continues to play some undefined role in fourth amendment 
jurisprudence. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Justice White suggested an alternative approach to the good faith ques-
tion in his concilrring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 1114 in which he ex-
pressed the view that the operation of the exclusionary rule and the ques-
tion of good faith should not be divorced from substantive fourth 
amendment law.186 Unfortunately, Justice White abandoned this view in 
United States v. Leon1116 and adopted the majority's position in Gates 
that the remedy of exclusion is separate from the question of substantive 
fourth amendment rights. 1417 Had· Justice White retained his goal of inte-
grating the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception into the full 
body of fourth amendment jurisprudence, he could have used a consistent 
approach in Gates and Leon. The Court in Gates abandoned the rigid 
rules of Aguilar v. Texas168 in favor of a more flexible totality of the cir-
cumstances test. 1 .. Instead of formulating a rigid rule on good faith in its 
decision in Leon, the Court should have shown the same preference for 
the flexibility inherent in an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances. 
The Court should recognize that police good faith is but one of the 
circumstances affecting the application of the exclusionary rule. The rem-
edy of exclusion, like the determination of substantive fourth amendment 
rights, is best addressed by balancing all of the relevant circumstances. 
The flexibility inherent in a totality of the circumstances test allows the 
Court to attach some unspecified weight to police motivation, instead of 
being forced to Leon's all-or-nothing decision on good faith.17° For exam-
164. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
165. "(T]he scope of the exclusionary rule cannot be divorced from the Fourth Amend-
ment .... (T]he issues surrounding a proposed good faith exception are intricately and 
inseverably tied to the nature of the Fourth Amendment violation .... " Id. at 249 (White, 
J., concurring). 
166. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). 
167. "Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case, 
our decisions make clear, is 'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.'" 
Id. at 3412 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 223). 
168. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
169. 104 S. Ct. at 3411 n.5. 
170. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
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pie, a flexible balancing approach would permit the Court to find that 
certain invasions of privacy are deemed so serious (e.g., a seizure of a 
personal diary) that even reasonable mistakes cannot be tolerated. Under 
a flexible balancing approach to the application of the exclusionary rule, 
the weight accorded police motivation would be deliberately left ambigu-
ous, just as it remains ambiguous in other fourth amendment areas. Al-
though 'bright line' clarity is sacrificed under such an approach, recogniz-
ing police good faith as one relevant factor in the totality of 
circumstances is consistent with the Court's overall balancing approach to 
fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
III. EPILOGUE 
Fourth Amendment Cliches: A Tongue-in-Cheek Look at the Good 
Faith Exception 
'Tho boys throw stones at frogs in jest, the frogs do not die in jest but 
in earnest.' The United States Supreme Court ignored this old maxim on 
motivation and recently hurled some fatal stones at the fourth amend-
ment. The Court's adoption of the good faith exception in United States 
v. Leon171 adds nothing new to an understanding of fourth amendment 
jurisprudence, but merely recites some rather tired cliches. We may now 
be entering an era when search and seizure cases are decided, not by rea-
soned analysis, but by invocation of handy cliches. The reader can test 
his or her ability at this new form of fourth amendment practice by an-
swering the following quiz and comparing his or her responses with the 
best and worst answers as scored by the Supreme Court. 
1) The road to hell is paved with good 
intentions. 
2) The end justifies the means. 
3) Ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
4) What you don't know can't hurt you. 
5) The buck stops here. . 
6) What you see is what you get. 
7) It doesn't count if you don't mean it. 
8) Work expands to fill the time available. 
.T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
1) The road to hell is paved with good intentions. The correct answer 
is False. It is the road to admission of illegally seized evidence that is 
paved with good intentions. The good faith exception recognizes police 
motivation as the sine qua non of the exclusionary rule. In other words, 
171. 104 S. Ct. at 3405. 
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the exclusionary rule exists to deter police misconduct, and there can be 
no misconduct when the police make reasonable good faith efforts to 
comply with the fourth amendment by obtaining a search warrant. Worst 
answer-The good faith exception is inadequate because it assumes that 
the exclusionary rule exists only to address deliberate police misconduct. 
Totally ignored is the exclusionary rule's objective of educating the police 
about lawful searches so that a citizen's right to privacy will be intruded 
upon only when the constitutional requirement of probable cause is met. 
2) The end justifies the means. True. Legal technicalities such as con-
stitutional rights cannot stand in the way of effective law enforcement. 
The 'first' principle of fourth amendment interpretation is that the con-
. stitutional standard must be "workable for application by rank and file, 
trained police officers."171 Worst answer-'No man is above the law.' Law 
enforcement officials have a responsibility to know and obey the law, even 
· when they act upon noble intent to apprehend law breakers. 
3) Ignorance of the law is no excuse. The correct answer is true for 
criminal defendants; false for police officers. Worst answer-The good 
faith exception encourages police to remain ignorant of the constitutional 
standards for proper searches. (See question (4) below). 
4) What you don't know can't hurt you. The correct answer is true. 
Worst answer-The conscientious law enforcement officer who seeks to 
comply with constitutional requirements is at a disadvantage. If he recog-
nizes that probable cause is lacking, he will have to continue his investi-
gation until adequate facts are developed. The officer who is ignorant of 
constitutional standards will see probable cause lurking behind every 
tree. The officer has nothing to lose and everything to gain when he sub-
mits inadequate information to a magistrate who is equally ignorant of 
probable cause requirements. 
5) The buck stops here. False. The police have no responsibility to 
make a correct determination of probable cause, but may pass the buck 
to the magistrate. (Extra credit if the officer spouts another cliche: 'It's 
not my job.') Worst answer-In the area of warrantless searches the 
Court has recognized that the police may substitute their determination 
of probable cause for the judgment of a magistrate. Given this power (and 
presumed knowledge) to recognize when probable cause is present, the 
police should have the concomitant responsibility (and knowledge) to rec-
ognize when probable cause is lacking. 
6) What you see is what you get. The correct answer is false. If the 
magistrate accepts an affidavit to search for seizable item X, but issues a 
warrant for seizable item Z, the police may search for X.173 The police 
172. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983). 
173. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). 
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need not read the warrant to see if they got what they asked for. Worst 
answer-It is not an unconscionable burden to require police to read the 
warrant they plan to execute. 
7) It doesn't count if you don't mean it. True. Citizens will forgive 
violations of their privacy so long as the offending officer did not inten-
tionally violate the citizen's constitutional rights. Extra credit for: 'I'll 
still respect you in the morning.' Worst answer-"Experience should 
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent.''174 
8) Work expands to fill the time available. The best answer is true. 
The judiciary in this country has too much time on its hands and will 
welcome the opportunity to render advisory opinions on unconstitutional 
searches even though the opinion has no effect on the case before the 
bench. Worst answer-Courts do not generally render advisory opinions, 
and overburdened courts will regard the constitutionality of the search as 
a moot point whenever the good faith exception applies. Fourth amend-
ment law, thus, will stagnate because the police may reasonably rely on 
existing law and cannot be required to anticipate future developments 
defining illegal searches. 
It may take some time to become comfortable with this new form of 
litigation by cliche, but it does have advantages. Justice Rehnquist once 
observed: "Very little that has been said in our previous decisions . . . 
and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of 
the [Fourth] Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula 
for judging cases such as this.''1111 Nonetheless, the average search and 
seizure case takes little more than twice as many pages as the average of 
all cases decided by the Supreme Court. These lengthy discourses have 
wasted a great deal of paper and endangered our national forests. 
Thousands of trees will be spared when counsel can utilize a short hand 
method of argument by cliche, and even more trees will be saved when 
the Court can limit its opinion to that most comprehensive of all 
cliches: 'I know it when I see it.' 
174. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (over-
ruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)). 
175. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973). 
